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Abstract
We revisit the linear Cournot model with uncertain demand that is studied in [7] and
provide sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of an equilibrium that complement the ex-
isting results. We show that if the distribution of the demand intercept has the decreasing
mean residual demand (DMRD) or the increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) property,
then uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed. The DMRD condition implies log-concavity
of the expected profits per unit of output without additional assumptions on the existence
or the shape of the density of the demand intercept and hence, answers in the affirmative
the conjecture of [7] that such conditions may not be necessary.
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1 Introduction
[7] considers a model of Cournot competition with linear demand – up to the non-negativity con-
straint for the market price – in which the demand intercept is stochastic. Demand uncertainty
can make the expected demand sufficiently convex which in turn may lead to a multiplicity of
equilibria, [16, 6]. Motivated by this, [7] studies conditions on the distribution of the stochas-
tic demand that guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium. His main result is that to establish
uniqueness, it is sufficient to assume that the distribution has monotone or first decreasing
and then increasing (equivalently bathtub-shaped, see also Section 2.2) hazard rate and that the
expected profit per unit of resource is log-concave as the total output approaches zero, cf. [7,
Proposition 1]. The latter is achieved by restricting the value at zero of the density of the
stochastic demand intercept.
In this note, we extend these conditions. We utilize unimodality conditions that we derived
in the more general setting of pricing problems with stochastic linear demand, [11], and show
that equilibrium uniqueness is achieved if the distribution of the demand intercept has the
decreasing mean residual demand (DMRD) property or the increasing generalized failure rate
(IGFR) property. This is established in Theorem 3.2. The DMRD and IGFR conditions are not
comparable, i.e., neither implies the other. Concerning their relationship to the conditions from
[7], the increasing hazard rate property does imply both DMRD and IGFR. However, this is not
necessarily true for the decreasing hazard rate nor for the bathtub-shaped property, [5]. Hence,
the sufficient DMRD and IGFR conditions generalize rather than substitute the existing ones.
Given the inclusiveness of the IGFR class of distributions, see [13, 3], the present conditions
cannot be significantly extended. In case that the Cournot oligopolists face zero marginal cost,
the uniqueness result can be directly obtained for the class of distributions with the decreasing
generalized mean residual demand (DGMRD) property and finite n+ 1-th moment, where n is
1
the number of competitors. This is the statement of Corollary 3.3. The DGMRD class includes
as a proper subset the IGFR class, [4, 11]. Finally, as shown in Theorem 3.5, the DMRD
condition implies log-concavity of the expected profit per unit of output without requiring the
existence of a density nor any restrictions on its value close to zero (if such a density exists).
This answers in the affirmative the conjecture of [7] that the imposed restriction on the value
at zero of the density of the stochastic demand may not be necessary.
1.1 Outline
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.1 we restate the model of [7] and in
Section 2.2, we define all related probabilistic notions. To make the exposition self-contained,
we also provide the relevant results from [11]. Our main contribution is presented Section 3.
2 Model and Definitions
2.1 Cournot Model
Consider a Cournot market with n ≥ 1 identical competing firms, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} that produce
a homogeneous good. Each firm has the same constant marginal cost, denoted by c > 0. Firm i’s
production quantity is denoted by xi and the total industry output is denoted by x :=
∑n
i=1 xi.
Also, using standard notation, let x−i := (x1, x2, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
The firms face a linear1 inverse demand function
p (x) = (α− bx)+ =
{
α− bx, if bx > α
0, otherwise
(1)
where p is the price and b > 0 is a non-negative parameter that denotes the demand slope.
The demand intercept or demand level α is a non-negative random variable that takes values in
[0,H] for some real numberH > 0 or in [0,H), if H = +∞. We assume that α has an absolutely
continuous distribution function F , density f = F ′, and finite expectation Eα < +∞, that also
satisfies Eα > c. We will write F¯ (x) := 1 − F (x) to denote the tail of the distribution of F .
Firms are risk neutral and maximize their expected payoffs
πi (xi;x−i) := xi
(
E (α− bx)+ − c
)
(2)
with respect to their own output xi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. A vector of outputs
(
x∗i , x
∗
−i
)
is a pure
Nash equilibrium if πi
(
x∗i , x
∗
−i
)
≥ πi
(
xi, x
∗
−i
)
, for all xi ≥ 0. A pure Nash equilibrium is called
symmetric if x∗i ≡ x
∗ for some x∗ > 0, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. In this case, we will slightly abuse
notation and denote the Nash equilibrium with x∗. Any symmetric Nash equilibrium satisfies
the first order condition ∫ H
bnx∗
αf (α) dα− c = (n+ 1) bx∗F¯ (bnx∗) , (3)
cf. [7], Lemma 1. Our scope is to determine conditions on the distribution F of α, so that
(3) has a unique solution, or equivalently that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. [7] derives such conditions which are reported in Theorem 3.1.
2.2 Probabilistic Notions
Let h (x) := f (x) /F¯ (x), for x < H denote the hazard or failure rate of α and g (x) := xh (x),
the generalized failure rate of α, [9, 15]. We will say that h is bathtub-shaped or simply B-shaped
1Up to the non-negativity constraint.
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if there exists a x0 > 0 (not necessarily unique) such that h (x) is non-increasing for x < x0 and
h (x) is non-decreasing for x > x0, [5, 12]. Also, we will say that F has the increasing failure
rate (IFR) property, if h (x) is non-decreasing for x < H. Similarly, we will say that F has the
increasing generalized failure rate property or simply that F is IGFR, if g (x) is non-decreasing
for x < H. Finally, let
m (x) :=


E (α− x | α > x) =
1
F¯ (x)
∫ H
x
F¯ (u) du, if x < H
0, otherwise
(4)
denote the mean residual demand (MRD) function of α, [14, 8] and ℓ (x) := m (x) /x, for
0 < x < H, the generalized mean residual demand (GMRD) function, [11]. Since α is non-
negative, we have that m (0) = Eα. We will say that α has the decreasing mean residual demand
property, or simply that α is DMRD, if m (x) is non-increasing for x < H and similarly, that α
has the decreasing generalized mean residual demand property, or simply that α is DGMRD, if
ℓ (x) is non-increasing for x < H. To derive the set of sufficient conditions of the present paper,
we will make use of the following properties from [11].
Lemma 2.1. Let α be a non-negative random variable with Eα < +∞.
(i). If α is DGMRD with lim
x→+∞
ℓ (x) = γ, and β ≥ 0 is a constant, then γ < 1/β, if and only
if Eαβ+1 < +∞. In particular, γ = 0 if and only if Eαβ+1 < +∞ for every β > 0.
(ii). If α is IGFR, then α is DGMRD. The converse is not true in general.
Concerning Lemma 2.1-(ii), we additionally remark that trivially, the IFR property implies
the IGFR and the DMRD implies the DGMRD property, respectively. The IFR property also
implies the DMRD property, however, the DMRD and IGFR propertis are not comparable.
Also, distributions with decreasing failure rate may or not may not be IGFR, [10].
3 Sufficient Conditions
Using the notation and terminology of the previous section, the main results of [7] for the game
defined in Section 2.1 can be restated as follows.
Theorem 3.1 ([7]). There exists at least one symmetric Nash equilibrium and no asymmetric
equilibria. If f (0) < [Eα− c]−1 and h (x) is (i) monotone or (ii) B-shaped, then this Nash
equilibrium is unique.
The statement of Theorem 3.1 in [7] does not use the B-shaped terminology, but rather
states that the slope of h (x) needs to change sign exactly once starting from negative and
turning to positive. It is immediate to see, that B-shaped distributions satisfy this property.
To proceed with the derivation of new conditions, we will use an equivalent formulation of the
first order condition in (3). For this, we define
Λ (x) := m (x)− cF¯ (x)−1 − xn−1, for x ≥ 0
and observe that any symmetric pure Nash equilibrium x∗ > 0 must satisfy Λ (x∗) = 0. Since,
Λ (0) = Eα− c > 0 by assumption and limx→H− Λ (x) = −∞, we have that Λ (x) starts positive
and ends negative. This establishes the – already well known – existence of symmetric pure
Nash equilibria in this model, cf. [1]. Concerning uniqueness, we have the following sufficient
conditions.
Theorem 3.2. If α is (i) DMRD or (ii) IGFR, then the symmetric pure Nash equilibrium is
unique.
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Proof. Part (i) is obvious, since in this case Λ (x) is decreasing for x > 0. To prove part (ii), it
suffices to show that Λ (x∗) < 0 for every equilibrium x∗. By continuity of Λ (x), this implies
that Λ (x) crosses the x-axis at most once and hence, it establishes the claim. Taking the
derivative of Λ (x), we obtain that Λ′ (x) = h (x) Λ (x) + 1
n
(g (x)− (n+ 1)). Since Λ (x∗) = 0
for every equilibrium, the sign of Λ (x∗) is determined by the sign of the term g (x) − (n+ 1).
To proceed, we consider Λ (x) /x which is equal to
Λ (x) /x = ℓ (x)− c
(
xF¯ (x)
)
−1
− n−1
Since, by assumption, α is IGFR, Lemma 2.1-(ii) implies that ℓ (x) is decreasing for all x ≥ 0,
since α is DGMRD in this case. Moreover,
(
xF¯ (x)
)
′
= F¯ (x) (1− g (x)) which implies that
−
(
xF¯ (x)
)
−1
is decreasing for all x ≥ 0 such that g (x) > 1. Hence, as a sum of decreasing
functions, Λ (x) /x is also decreasing for all x ≥ 0 such that g (x) > 1. Along with Λ (x∗) = 0
for any equlibrium x∗ > 0, this implies that
0 > (Λ (x) /x)′
∣∣∣
x=x∗
= Λ′ (x∗) /x∗
and hence, that Λ′ (x∗) < 0 for any x∗ > 0 such that g (x∗) > 1. If x∗ is such that g (x∗) ≤ 1,
then trivially Λ (x∗) = 1
n
(g (x)− (n+ 1)) < 0 which concludes the proof of case (ii).
Neither the DMRD nor the IGFR conditions make use of the the assumption f (0) <
(Eα− c)−1 which is necessary for Theorem 3.1 to hold. However, the DMRD, IGFR, monote
decreasing or B-shaped hazard rate conditions are not comparable, since none implies the other,
cf. [5], and hence Theorem 3.2 should be interpreted as complementing rather than substitut-
ing Theorem 3.1. In the special case that c = 0, uniqueness is established under the following
condition.
Corollary 3.3. If c = 0 and α is DGMRD with finite (n+ 1)-th moment, then the Nash
equilibrium is unique.
Proof. In this case Λ (x) /x = ℓ (x)− n−1 and the conclusion follows from Lemma 2.1-(i).
Remark 3.4. The assumption that α has a density f is not necessary for the DMRD or
DGMRD conditions, since they are defined in terms of the cdf F . They still apply if F is
merely continuous. In this case, we need to rewrite Equation (3) in terms of F . Addtionally,
the assumption that α is supported on an interval is also not necessary for DMRD and DGMRD
conditions, cf. [11]. However, for the IGFR to hold, it is necessary that α is supported on an
interval, [10]. Since, these assumptions increase the complexity without trully generalizing
the results in economic terms, we restsricted our presentation to distributions with a density.
Finally, although DGMRD distributions are a proper superset of IGFR distributions as stated
in Lemma 2.1-(ii), Corollary 3.3 cannot be viewed as a direct generalization of Theorem 3.2 due
to the moment restriction.
The condition f (0) < (Eα− c)−1 which is necessary for Theorem 3.1 to hold, guarantees
that (P (x)− c) is log-concave for values of x close to 0. [7] conjectures that in view of [1],
Theorem 2.7, this assumption may not be necessary2. Theorem 3.2 shows that this is indeed
the case for distributions with the DMRD property which implies the required log-concavity of
the expected per unit profit. The DMRD condition does not assume the existence of a density
and hence applies to a broader set of distributions.
Theorem 3.5. If α ∼ F is DMRD and F is continuous, then P (x)− c is log-concave.
2This assumption is rather weak as it is satisfied by any distribution with f (0) = 0 in particular.
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Proof. P (x) − c is log-concave if and only if (P (x)− c)′ / (P (x)− c) is decreasing, [2]. To
calculate the derivative of P (x), we rewrite P (x) as
P (x) =
∫ H
bx
(α− bx) f (α) dα = E (α− bx)+ = m(bx) F¯ (bx)
Since F is continuous with finite expectation, we have that
d
dx
E (α− bx)+ =
d
dx
(
Eα−
∫ bx
0
F¯ (u) du
)
= −bF¯ (bx)
Hence,
(P (x)− c)′
(P (x)− c)
=
−bF¯ (bx)
m (bx) F¯ (bx)− c
= −b ·
1
m (bx)− c
F¯ (bx)
which implies that (P (x)− c)′ / (P (x)− c) is decreasing if m (bx) − cF¯ (bx)−1 is decreasing.
Since −cF¯ (bx)−1 is decreasing, the claim follows.
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